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VENTURE CAPITAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS*
Eric Weinmannt
To close the "equity gap" for small business, Congress enacted
the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. Under this Act, the
Small Business Administration licenses, regulates and finances
investment companies which assist small concerns. The author
describes how the Small Business Administration does this
under a revised set of regulations, published in late 1973.
BACKGROUND
In 1958, Congress established a program to be administered by the
Small Business Administration ("SBA"), by enacting the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958 ("SBIAct").' Its purpose was to close the
"equity gap" 2 which was found to affect small business adversely. The
term "equity gap" denotes that area in the capital markets that lies
between the banks and other institutional lenders, which are not geared
to make equity or long-term investments; the SBA's programs of
financial assistance to small concerns; and the public securities markets
which do not favor the smaller and smallest business concerns. Accord-
ingly, Congress declared its policy to establish: "[A] program to stim-
ulate and supplement the flow of private equity capital and long-term
loan funds which small-business concerns need for the sound financing
of their business operations and for their growth, expansion, and
modernization, and which are not available in adequate supply ....
The SBA was created in 1953 and derives its present authority from
the Small Business Act of 1958, as amended,4 the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958, as amended' and other laws. The SBA
provides financial, procurement and management assistance to small
business concerns and also assists victims of natural disasters, small
* This article is not subject to copyright.
t dipl. oec., 1935, Handels-Hochschule, Berlin, Germany; M.A., 1947 Columbia University;
J.D., 1957, Columbia University: LL.M., 1961, Georgetown University Law Center; Chief
Counsel for Investment, Small Business Administration; Member of the District of Columbia
and New York Bars. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author, and do not neces-
sarily reflect those of the Small Business Administration. The author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of Lester N. Salwin of the Illinois and Missouri Bars.
1. Act of Aug. 21, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1970)).
2. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FINANCING SMALL BUSINESS (1958). See also BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, SURVEY OF REPORTS OF CREDIT AND CAPITAL DIFFICULTIES By SMALL MANUFAC-
TURERS (1935).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
4. Id. § 631.
5. Id. § 661.
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concerns required to comply with, or adversely affected by, federal
programs such as environmental, safety, health or construction pro-
grams, and the handicapped. Financial assistance includes both direct
and guaranteed loans.6 The SBIAct introduced the concept of a small
business investment company ("SBIC") as a privately owned, privately
managed, state-incorporated body organized solely for the purpose of
performing the functions and conducting the activities contemplated by
the Act. SBICs are licensed and regulated by the SBA, and in most
cases, to encourage their formation and growth, the SBA extends
financing to them.
The various SBA programs are supplemented by the SBIC program,
which renders assistance of a kind not generally available from the SBA
directly, e.g., equity capital and loans with equity features. On August
31, 1973, there were 338 licensed and operating SBICs, with aggregate
private capital exceeding $350 million, which reported their outstand-
ing loans and investments in approximately 5,000 small concerns total-
ling more than one-half billion dollars, most investments ranging in size
from $18,000 to $76,000.'
Under present law, the SBA financing of SBICs may be subordinated
to other lenders, be for a term up to 15 years, and may rise to 200% of
private capital, not to exceed $15 million; the larger SBICs (with
private capital of $500,000 or more) emphasizing venture-capital invest-
ments such as equity or other financings with subordination or non-
amortization characteristics approaching the nature of equity, may
receive leverage to 300% of private capital, not to exceed $20 million,
from the SBA.' The SBA is also authorized to purchase the preferred
stock of SBICs, which invest exclusively in small concerns owned by
persons whose participation in the free enterprise system is hampered
by social or economic disadvantages; there is no dollar limit on the total
leverage which the SBA may make available to such specialized SBICs,
commonly known as Sec. 301(d) Licensees, a reference to that section
of the SBIAct which gave them statutory recognition.9
From the inception of the SBIC program over 15 years ago, to
December 31, 1973, the SBA provided leverage in the aggregate amount
of $667 million to all SBICs; at the latter date, an aggregate leverage of
$453 million was outstanding. The SBA leverage initially consisted of
direct loans, made by the SBA to eligible Licensees; under budgetary
restraints resulting in protracted and severe funding shortages, the SBA
developed a system of SBA-guaranteed funding from private investors
which received statutory recognition at the end of 1971.
6. Id. § 636.
7. The SBA periodically publishes the latest composite financial data and statistics on in-
vestments by industry, geographical distribution, size, etc. SBA, SBIC INDUSTRY RE-
VIEW.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 683(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
9. Id. § 683(c). The SBA created the program administratively in 1969. It received statutory
recognition and added encouragement from the enactment of the SBI Act. For a descrip-
tion of this program and a summary of its legislative history see Weinmann, A Piece of
the Action for the Disadvantaged, 31 FED. B.J. 336 (1972). See note 28 infra.
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The SBA may guarantee the timely payment of all principal and
interest as scheduled on SBIC debentures.' 0 These debentures may be
pooled and sold to the public through issuance of debentures fully
guaranteed as to principal and interest by the SBA. The SBA guaranty
is secured by the full faith and credit of the United States. As of
December 31, 1973 there were $185.4 million of these SBA guaranteed
debentures outstanding. They had a term of 10 years and carry interest
rates ranging from 7%-7-3/8%. The debentures were issued in $10,000
denominations and were not redeemable prior to maturity.
From the original enactment to the present time, Congress has
amended the SBIAct at almost every session.' ' The trend of these
amendments has been threefold:
(1) To increase the flexibility of SBICs in their use of financing
modes, so that today virtually every long-term financing method
is available;
(2) To increase the regulatory power of the SBA to curb abuses
which have developed;
(3) To increase the leverage available from the SBA, or with the
SBA's guaranty.
In response to these amendments, the SBA has continually updated
its regulations under the SBIAct' 2 by adopting five revisions, each of
which was repeatedly amended. The fifth and current revision' 3 .is the
subject of this article. Rev. 5 omitted the SBA's Audit Guide for SBICs,
which previously appeared as an Appendix of the regulations, and its
System of Account Classifications, previously a separate part of the
SBA's regulations;'" these documents will be separately printed and
distributed by the SBA and are to be followed by SBICs and their
auditors.' ' As in prior revisions, the forms to be used by SBICs, and
the relevant instructions are incorporated by reference in the regula-
tion, and are thus mandatory.' 6
Generally speaking, the regulations are the same for Sec. 301(d)
Licensees and for other Licensees not specializing in investments in
disadvantaged concerns. There are, however, certain differences which
will be noted in this discussion.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 683(b) (Supp. II, 1972); see 13 C.F.R. § 107.201(b) (1974) (implementing this
authority). For a description of the guaranteed financing process see Chase & Weinmann,
This Little Agency Went to Market, 89 BANK. L.J. 195 (1972).
11. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-595, § 2, 86 Stat. 1314; Act of Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-213, § 10, 85 Stat. 776; Act of Oct. 11, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-104 §§ 201-11, 81
Stat. 269; Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 87-779, §§ 2-7, 9, 80 Stat. 1359; Act of Feb. 28,
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-273, §§ 2-6, 78 Stat. 146; Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-341, §§
2-11, 75 Stat. 752; Act of June 11, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-502, §§ 2-6, 74 Stat. 196.
12. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 687(c) (1970) (granting the SBA regulatory power).
13. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1 et seq. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rev. 51.
14. 13 C.F.R. part 111 (1973).
15. 38 Fed. Reg. 30837 n.1 (1973).




While the licensing process begins, strictly speaking, with the sub-
mission of a license application,' ' the SBA has adopted informal
procedures that enable proponents to obtain guidance on the proper
preparation of an acceptable application. Thus, proponents may submit
proposed charters and bylaws prior to voting on their adoption or filing
them with state authorities. Plans of capitalization and operation may
also be presubmitted, and in some instances informal prefiling con-
ferences are held by the staff of the Investment Division with prospec-
tive applicants. Upon the filing of an application, the SBA publishes the
pertinent facts for comment, usually during a period of 15 days from
date of publication in the Federal Register and a similar notice is
published locally by the applicant, and certified to the SBA.' 8
In processing a license, the SBA must first apply the statutory
standards. The significant standards-apart from the obvious, such as
corporate powers, duration of the corporation-are:
(1) the demonstrated need,
(2) the general business reputation and character of owners and
management, and
(3) the probability of successful operation from the standpoint of
profitability and soundness.' 9
Accordingly, proponents submit data supporting the existing need for a
SBIC in the proposed area of operations, personal history statements
concerning the principals, and business projections based on the pro-
posed plan of operations. In addition, the SBA must determine that the
proposed private capital, which cannot be less than $150,000, is ade-
quate "to assure a reasonable prospect that the company will be
operated soundly and profitably, and managed actively and pru-
dently. ... "" That an investment company must be adequately cap-
italized to support competent management from its inception, before
investment returns can be expected, is a matter of common experi-
ence,2 ' heightened in the case of SBICs because of the greater diffi-
culty of finding promising investments which qualify.2 2 Based on
experience and as a result of studies on the subject of optimal size,2 3
the SBA determined that in most cases a private capital of at least
17. Id. § 107.102.
18. Id. § 107.103.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 681(c) (1970).
20. Id. § 682(a)(2).
21. Cf. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14 (1970).
22. For the purposes of the Small Business Investment Company program, a concern is small
if its assets do not exceed $7.5 million, its net worth is not more than $2.5 million and its
two-year average income after taxes does not exceed $250,000; a concern may also qualify
under the regular business loan size standards. 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-11 (1974).
23. Hearings on S. 1862 Before the Subcomm. on Small Business of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967).
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$300,000 is required;2 4 smaller capitalization is acceptable in areas
with no or few SBICs, and for Sec. 301(d) Licensees where a "strong
parent" such as a major industrial or financial corporation undertakes
to absorb operating expenses in excess of 8% per annum of private
capital, and to supply management services to prevent capital deple-
tion.2 5
Since Sec. 301(d) Licensees fulfill a need at which other federal and
state programs are also aimed, such a Licensee can sometimes obtain
public grant funds toward their capitalization.2 6 In these cases, the
SBA will recognize and leverage public funds as "private capital," if
these grants are "without strings" and if non-public funds are also
contributed to, or used to acquire stock in, such Licensees. The reason
for requiring an admixture of non-public funds lies in the basic concept
of the SBIAct.2' The SBIC concept is one of partnership between
private enterprise and the federal government, to assist small con-
cerns;' private enterprise supplies investment acumen and follow-up
management assistance, and backs its judgment and know-how, in part,
with its own funds. Accordingly, the SBA will recognize public grant
funds as "private," on the theory of their severance from the public
purse, and in recognition of the profit motive of the private investor in
the Sec. 301(d) Licensee. The $150,000 minimum capital and a 10%




When borrowed funds are used to acquire an interest of 10% or more
of any Licensee's shares, the SBA requires such stockholder to have a
net worth of at least twice the amount borrowed. 3 0 The reason for this
requirement is the venture capital nature of SBIC investment; the
obligation of a major stockholder to repay his loan could inhibit the
Licensee from venturing, if that stockholder did not have other means
to meet this obligation. In appropriate cases, the SBA may waive or
modify its net worth rule.
INVESTMENT POLICY
Rev. 5 abandoned the diversification requirement of prior revisions,
except as it relates to real estate: only a limited portion of the portfolio
of a Licensee which is not a Sec. 301(d) Licensee may consist of
24. The Small Business Investment Act offers a third-dollar leverage incentive for a minimum
capital of $500.000. 15 U.S.C. § 683 (Supp. I, 1972).
25. SBA, MESBIC (1969). See also 13 C.F.R. § 107.101(d)(1) (1974).
26. See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Act §§ 701, 714(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2981, 2982(a)(1)
(Supp. II, 1972).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
28. The "partnership" concept was reinforced when the SBA was authorized to purchase
nonvoting preferred stock in section 301(d) Licensees up to the amount of private capi-
tal. 15 US.C. § 683(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
29. 13 C.F.R. § 107.101(d)(2) (1974).
30. Id. § 107.101(e).
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permissible real estate investments. I No such limitation is imposed on
Sec. 301(d) Licensees. The regulation recognizes the SBA's past prac-
tice, no longer in effect, of licensing "real estate specialists," who may
maintain an approved larger portion. "Real Estate Investments" are
defined as those real estate related investments classified under Major
Groups 15 (Building Construction), 65 (Real Estate-within that group
only certain industries are acceptable) and 70 (Hotels and other
lodging places). No more than one-third of the portfolio may be
maintained in one, nor more than two-thirds in any combination of the
three groups.3 2 Sec. 301(d) Licensees are not limited, in recognition of
their special mission to facilitate business entry of their constituency.
Sec. 301(d) Licensees are required to include an investment policy in
their charter which limits their investments to disadvantaged con-
cerns. 33
CONTROL OF LICENSEE
In recognition of the statutory requirement of the SBA's approval
for the principals of an SBIC, a license may not be transferred,3 4 nor
may control over a Licensee be transferred without the SBA's approval.
The regulations subject not only the transfer of full control, but also
lesser transfers which may result in control over 10 or more percent of
the stock, to the SBA's scrutiny. In view of the possibility of a transfer
without the Licensee's or the SBA's knowledge, the regulations bar the
Licensee from recognizing such a transfer which has not been approved
by the SBA. The regulations further give the SBA a right in the case of
closely held SBICs to hold unauthorized transferors personally liable,
by express contract, for the SBICs' indebtedness to the SBA, such
liability to terminate on the SBA's approval of such transfer. The
formalities and standards involved in the SBA's approval of a transfer of
control are patterned on those involved in an original license grant,
since there is little substantive difference between license acquisitions
by original grant, or by transfer of control over a Licensee. 3 A
correlation to the foregoing provision is that requiring notification to
the SBA in the event of the pledge by a stockholder of as much as 10%
of an SBIC's stock, since it is in the nature of a pledge that ownership
of the stock parcel involved may be transferred to the pledgee.
3 6
The SBIAct gives the SBA the power to control the amount of shares
that anyone may own in one or more SBICs.3' The SBA has exercised
31. Id § 107.101(c)(1).
32. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL
(1972).
33. 13 C.F.R. § 107.205(a)(1) (1974).
34. Id. § 107.104.
35. Id. § 107.701; cf. Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1970).
36. 13 C.F.R. § 107.703 (1974).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 682(c) (1970).
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that power by subjecting common control over two or more SBICs to
its approval, but has exempted Sec. 301(d) Licensees from this require-
ment3 8 since it is the SBA's policy to encourage the formation of Sec.
301(d) Licensees by other Licensees 39 as well as by non-Licensees.
The SBIAct limits the amounts of voting stock that a federally
regulated bank4 0 may acquire to less than 50% of such voting stock
and to 5% of such bank's capital and surplus. 4' Prior to 1968, there
was no limitation on the percentage of voting stock that such a bank
could acquire, and there are several bank-owned SBICs, licensed before
the effective date of the 1967 amendments. Such banks may increase
their stockholdings in their SBIC so long as they do not also increase
the percentage of their voting control.4 2 Beyond this, the bank owner-
ship limitation has caused numerous interpretive problems, relating to
the ownership of voting stock by several banks, or the combined
ownership of a SBIC by a bank and persons related to it or the
combined ownership by a bank of voting and nonvoting stock. In these
instances, the SBA's interpretations have been guided by the spirit of
the statute, since a literal reading would not reach such situations.
Generally speaking, the SBA has approved such combined holdings
where the majority holding was not, in fact, subservient to the bank.
LEVERAGE
Sections 303(b) and (c) of the Act authorize the SBA to leverage the
private capital of a SBIC. "Private capital" is defined as the combined
private paid-in capital and paid-in surplus, and excludes the SBA's
preferred stock capital and borrowed funds.4 A Licensee may issue its
stock for cash or cash equivalent, services and physical assets (not to
exceed their fair market value), as a stock dividend, or in connection
with a merger, reorganization or reclassification approved by the SBA.
However, a SBIC may not issue stock in exchange for eligible portfolio
securities (other than U.S. Government securities), except that a Sec.
301(d) Licensee formed with the participation of another Licensee4 4
may issue stock for securities of disadvantaged small concerns; in any
event the minimum capital must, in all cases, be contributed in cash or
38. 13 C.F.R. § 107.702 (1974).
39. See generally 13 C.F.R. § 107.813 (1974).
40. See also Bank Hold Company Act § 4(c)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1970): 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.111 (1973). An intriguing question is whether the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System has the power, under § 1843(c)(8), to determine that Small Business
Investment Company activity is sufficiently related to banking as to be a proper incident
thereto. Such a determination would permit a regulated bank holding company wholly to
own a Small Business Investment Company, § 1843(c)(5) notwithstanding. See generally
Implementation of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970: The Scope of
Banking Activities, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1170 (1973).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 682(b) (1970).
42. 13 C.F.R. § 107.811 (1974).
43. Id. § 107.3.
44. Id. § 107.813(c).
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cash equivalent.4 The capital represented by stock issued for such
consideration, is eligible for leveraging by the SBA. In rare cases, the
SBA will allow stock issues for other considerations, but will not
leverage the capital represented by such stock.
Generally speaking, the SBA is authorized to leverage private capital
up to twice,4 6 but in the case of SBICs with private capital of
$500,000 or more and which are venture-capital oriented, the SBA may
leverage private capital up to three times.
4 7
A Licensee with qualifying private capital will be considered venture-
capital oriented if it has at least 65% of its available funds invested in
"venture capital financings" of eligible small concerns, except that a
Sec. 301(d) Licensee need only have 30% so invested.4 ' "Venture
capital financings" are defined as being represented by shares of stock
or stock warrants, or by subordinated debt securities which are not
amortizable during the first three years.4
SBICs eligible for 200% leverage may not receive leverage in excess of
$15 million, but there is no dollar limit for Sec. 301(d) Licensees.
Similarly, the leverage limit for venture-capital oriented SBICs is $20
million, but there is no such limit for Sec. 301(d) Licensees." 0
The SBA may leverage SBICs through the purchase or guaranty of
their debentures, which will be subordinated to all creditors unless the
SBA "in its exercise of reasonable investment prudence and in consider-
ing the financial soundness of such [SBIC] determines otherwise."' '
Since 1970, the SBA has relied almost entirely on the public securities
market for leveraging SBICs not licensed pursuant to Sec. 301(d).' 2 To
ensure the uniformity of these debentures, the SBA adopted their terms
as a regulation' ' and incorporated the regulations into the debentures
by reference with the assurance that in respect to any given debenture
the regulation would remain in force.
Resort to the public market has resulted in interest rates roughly
equal to those of other government-guaranteed securities. Sec. 301(d)
Licensees, however, have received direct loans from the SBA and have
enjoyed interest rates on their debentures which, by statute," are
three percentage points below market rates during the first five years.
This interest subsidy, however, must be repaid before a Sec. 301(d)
45. Id. § 107.805.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 683(b)(1), (c)(2) (iii) (Supp. II, 1972).
47. Id. §§ 683(b)(2), (c)(2)(iii). See p. 192 infra.
48. 13 C.F.R. § 107.202(a) (1974).
49. Id. § 107.202(b).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 683(b)(1)-(2), (c)(2)(iii) (Supp. II, 1972).
51. Id. § 683(b).
52. See also p. 185 & note 10 supra.
53. 13 C.F.R. § 107.203(b)(7) (1974) (expressing the general rule of subordination of the
debentures).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 687i (Supp. II, 1972). The interest rate on debentures issued before Oct. 13,
1971, the date of the Presidential message proposing what was to become the Act of Oct.
27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-595, § 2(g), 86 Stat. 1316 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 687i (Supp. II,
1972)), was reduced for five years from that date.
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Licensee may make any distribution, whether from profits or otherwise,
to stockholders other than the SBA. The subsidy is, therefore, both
temporary and conditioned on the pretermission of distributions, in the
expectation that any available funds will be invested in disadvantaged
small concerns.' ' "The purpose of this provision is to assure the SBA
of a fair return before any distribution to private stockholders." ' 6
Within the limits stated above, ' the SBA may purchase, from Sec.
301(d) Licensees only, their nonvoting preferred stock up to a par value
equaling their private capital. This stock carries a 3% cumulative divi-
dend, which is payable in the sound discretion of the Board of Direc-
tors.' 8 While the subsidy involved in this low dividend rate is not
temporary, but may continue as long as the preferred stock is outstand-
ing to the SBA, its continuance may also be conditioned on abstaining
from distributions, since the SBA has discretionary authority to require
the payment of the difference between dividends actually paid, and the
government's own cost of money at the time of its purchase of
preferred stock before allowing a Sec. 301(d) Licensee to distribute any
assets to other stockholders. "This dividend provision complements
that requiring reimbursement of the debenture interest subsidy, so that
the SBA's fair return ahead of private shareholders is assured in both
cases."5 ' It is submitted that the SBA should exercise its discretionary
authority to maximize investment in disadvantaged concerns, rather
than distribution to stockholders. Since Congress has contrasted the 3%
dividend rate with a "fair return," it would follow that a return which
is not fair to the SBA should be put to program (as distinguished from
private) use.
A Sec. 301(d) Licensee has the option to retire the SBA's preferred
stock on any dividend date by paying the SBA the par value thereof. In
such event, the SBA is entitled to a "rain check" for the dividend
subsidy, to be cashed if the SBA elects to do so, before a distribution to
other stockholders.6 0 By this means a SBIC can stop the dividend
subsidy from cumulating further, without incurring an obligation to
pay the dividend subsidy at that time. Since the dividend subsidy is
defined as the difference between dividends actually paid and the
federal government's cost of money, it follows that the unpaid part of
the cumulated 3% dividend is not payable at call time, but is included
in the "rain check."
Similarly, on redemption of stock from other stockholders, or liqui-
dation in whole or in part, or any other distribution of assets, e.g.,
spin-off, which is not an ordinary dividend payable from retained
55. 13 C.F.R. § 107.205(a)(2)(iv) (1974).
56. S. REP. No. 1007, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972). See also H. R. REP. No. 1428, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1972).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 683(b)(2), (c)(2)(iii) (Supp. II, 1972).
58. 13 C.F.R. § 107.205(a)(2) (1974).
59. S. REP. No. 1007, supra note 56. See also H.R. REP. No. 1428, id. at 7; see p. 196 & note
105-06 infra.
60. 13 C.F.R. § 107.205(a)(2)(ii) (1974).
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earnings, the SBA is entitled to the par value of its preferred stock, the
interest subsidy and to the "rain check."' I
Any Licensee which has received three-for-one leverage must main-
tain the capital requirement (minimum: $500,000) and the venture
capital ratio to total available investment funds (30% for Sec. 301(d)
Licensees, 65% for other Licensees) as of the end of each fiscal year
during which third-dollar leverage remains outstanding,6 2 and failure to
do so entitles the SBA to accelerate the third-dollar leverage.6 3 The
SBA is authorized to mitigate this remedy in appropriate cases, such as
prepayments or capital increases.
All debt leverage is subject to acceleration on (1) default of payment
of principal or interest to the SBA, (2) failure to inform the SBA within
20 days of default on a debt to some one other than the SBA, (3)
violation of the Act or regulations, (4) nonperformance of a written
agreement with the SBA, or (5) the making of a false statement to the
SBA.6 ' Insolvency and acts of bankruptcy 6 I trigger automatic acceler-
ation, to preserve, if possible, the statutory federal priority 6 6 and to
avoid the result of United States v. Marxen,6 7 where the SBA has
guaranteed the SBIC debt to a third party holder.
Capital impairment, formerly a violation of the regulations,6  is no
longer a violation. A Sec. 301(d) Licensee with a retained earnings
deficit equaling its private capital, or another Licensee with a deficit
equaling one-half thereof, are now required to notify the SBA
promptly, and must cure such impairment within a time limit set for




The SBIAct contemplates two basic methods of financing by SBICs,
61. Id. § 107.205(a)(2)(ii) (1974).
62. Id. § 107.202(d).
63. Id. § 107.203(b)(6), (c); see note 47 supra.
64. Id. 88 107.203(b)(1), 107.1008; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 687(d) (1970).
65. Bankruptcy Act § 3, 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
66. Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administra-
tors, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to
the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall ex-
tend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all
his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and ef-
fects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of
law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.
31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
67. 307 U.S. 200 (1939) (where the federal priority was held not applicable to a general claim
in bankruptcy transferred to the United States after bankruptcy petition was filed).
Acceleration is matched by a corresponding subrogation provision in the guaranty instru-
ment. This issue has lost importance, since most leverage remaining outstanding is sub-
ordinated and, therefore, does not enjoy the federal priority.
68. 38 Fed. Reg. 30845 (1973) (reserving 13 C.F.R. § 107.1002).
69. 13 C.F.R. § 107.203(d) (1974).
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equity capital7" and loans. 7 ' In practice, the distinction between these
two financing methods is blurred, since the SBA regards loans with
equity features as equity capital.7 2 This position is supported by the
Act itself, which includes in "venture capital" "such common stock,
preferred stock, or other financing with subordination or nonamortiza-
tion characteristics as the Administration determines to be substantially
similar to equity financing." 7" Loans may be made in participation
with other lenders and participation may be deferred. In SBA parlance,
a deferred participation is a guaranty, and such guaranties are limited
by the statute to 90% of the outstanding balance. SBIC financing can
take the form of stock purchases (common or preferred), warrants to
purchase such stock, limited partnerships, or equity investments in
other unincorporated concerns,7 4 debt instruments which provide
either for conversion to stock or which have stock purchase warrants
attached, and any combination of the foregoing.
Equity investments in unincorporated concerns are fraught with the
danger that the investor may become liable for the general obligations
of the unincorporated concern. For example, § 7 of the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) subjects a limited partner to general
liability for partnership debts if he oversteps statutory restrictions
against management participation. Similarly, a "special" or "silent
partner" may become liable if he acts in any manner for the partner-
ship 7 I or participates in a misstatement of the partnership.
7 6
General liability may ensue when a limited partner holds partnership
property as collateral for a loan 7  or when a limited partnership
interest is redeemed with partnership property.7 8 Congress was aware
of this danger when it permitted such investments7" by stating: "It is
not intended to subject SBICs to the liability of their portfolio con-
cerns. The Administration is expected to regulate this new authority to
the exclusion of such a contingency . 8 0 Accordingly, the regula-
tion provides that a Licensee acquiring an equity position in a small
concern, may not "become a general partner ... or otherwise become
jointly or severally liable for the general obligations of an unincor-
porated Portfolio Concern, inadvertently or otherwise .... "' I except
through a guaranty, as discussed below.' 2 This provision was adopted
70. 15 U.S.C. § 684(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
71. Id. § 685(a) (1970).
72. 13 C.F.R. § 107.302(b) (1974).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 683(b) (1970).
74. Equity investments in unincorporated businesses were barred until the enactment of the
Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-595, § 2(e), 86 Stat. 1316, amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 684(a) (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 684(a) (Supp. II, 1972)).
75. 60 AM. JUR. 2d Partnership §§ 381-82 (1972).
76. Abendroth v. Van Dolsen, 131 U.S. 66 (1889).
77. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13.
78. Id. § 22.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 684(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
80. H.R. REP. No. 1428, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972).
81. 13 C.F.R. § 107.302(a) (1974).
82. See p. 194 & note 89 infra.
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over a proposal8 3 to require an unincorporated portfolio concern to
include in its contracts and related correspondence a disclaimer, similar
to that used by Massachusetts business trusts, limiting liability to the
unincorporated concern's own assets, and disclaiming liability of its
investors.8 4 It was felt that such disclaimer would be burdensome,8 s
and perhaps ineffective. Since the possibilities of general liability are
numerous, and a regulation guarding against them would have to be
inordinately detailed, the SBA left the responsibility of avoiding these
pitfalls to SBIC's management with a warning that intent to become
liable is not a necessary element of a violation.
Rev. 5 substantially liberalizes the implementation of the statutory
authorization of deferred participation,8 6 over that of prior revisions.
Subject to the general limitations applicable to all forms of financial
assistance, a Licensee may now guarantee the monetary obligation of a
small concern to any creditor (including a trade creditor) who is not an
Associate of the Licensee,' up to 90% of the obligation8  so long as
the total amount of all such guarantees does not exceed the private
capital. The Licensee must maintain a funded reserve of 10% against all
such guarantees. Associates of the Licensee may also become guaran-
teed creditors,8 9 subject to the regulation of conflicts of interest, dis-
cussed below.
In addition to immediate financing, a SBIC may also enter into a
commitment to finance a small concern; and charge a commitment fee.
The regulation adjusts the minimum periods for which financings must
be made, to permit shorter maturities so long as the aggregate periods
of commitment and financing equal at least the 5-year minimum period
discussed immediately hereafter.9 0 The purpose of permitting commit-
ments is to reduce the financing cost to the small concern, which may
have no immediate need for the funds, although it needs the assurance
of future availability, or the small concern may wish to establish a line
of credit with a third party, based on the SBIC's commitment.
The purpose clause of the SBIAct makes it clear that SBICs are
designed to furnish equity capital and long term loans to small con-
cerns. 9 Accordingly, the SBA has fixed the minimum maturity of
investments in general at 60 months, except that financings of dis-
advantaged small concerns" may be made by any Licensee, not only a
83. 38 Fed. Reg. 4519 (1973).
84. J. BOGEN, FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 376 (3d ed. 1962).
85. NASBIC News, Feb. 27, 1973, at 4.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 685(b) (1970). The Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-341, § 6, 75 Stat. 753,
substituted "other lenders, incorporated or unincorporated" for "other lending institu-
tions." This made guarantees to a larger class of creditors possible.
87. 13 C.F.R. § 107.3 (1974) (for the definition of "Associate of a Licensee").
88. 15 U.S.C. § 685(b) (1970). While the regulations do not state so, the 90% figure is
computed on the balance at time of disbursement, as distinguished from the face or
original amount.
89. 13 C.F.R. § 107.501 (1974).
90. Id. § 107.503.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
92. 13 C.F.R. § 107.3 (1974).
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Sec. 301(d) Licensee, for thirty months, so long as the total amount of
such financings does not exceed 50% of that Licensee's portfolio.
Prepayment, subject to a reasonable penalty, must be permitted; restric-
tions on prepayment (other than such penalty) require the approval of
the SBA.
9 3
In line with the minimum maturity, the regulations also fix maxi-
mum amortization, which as a general rule may not exceed, on the
average and in the aggregate, the limits of the straight-line method.9 4
An exception to the foregoing rules gives greater flexibility to Li-
censees, to the extent of 20% of their "total adjusted assets." '9  Where
it becomes necessary, as part of an overall financing arrangement, or to
protect an existing investment, or to finance a change of ownership,9 6
a SBIC may extend short-term financing (of less than 60 or 30 months,
respectively) to a small concern.9 In addition, also within this limita-
tion, a SBIC may hold 60-months loans, but not loans of shorter
maturity, amortizable at a rate not to exceed 40% of the declining
principal balance.9 "
All financings are subject to a statutory maximum for each loan.9 9
Without the approval of the SBA, a Licensee may not invest in and
commit to or on behalf of any small concern 00 more than 20% of its
private capital. For Sec. 301(d) Licensees, the SBA has raised this limit
to 30%. The purpose of this rule is diversification; given the risk of
small business investments, it is undesirable for a SBIC to have "too
many eggs in one basket." For the same reason, write-downs of existing
investments are not considered in computing the applicable per-
centage. ' 0
All financings (other than purchases of securities not bearing a stated
return, such as common stock, not subject to compulsory redemption
or "put") are further subject to a cost-of-money limitation of 15% per
annum.' 02 However, since SBICs are required to comply with all
93. Id. § 107.301(a). But see note 97 infra.
94. Id. § 107.301(b). But see note 97 infra.
95. Id. § 107.504(a). "Total adjusted assets" are defined as total assets less indebtedness to
the SBA and liabilities with a maturity of one year or less. The 20% of "total adjusted
assets" includes small business securities purchased from other than the issuer small
concern itself.
96. Id. § 107.812 (standards for the financing of ownership change).
97. Id. § 107.504(b).
98. Id. § 107.504(b) (2).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 686(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
100. 13 C.F.R. § 107.3 (1974) (including "affiliates" of small business concerns within the
definition of "small concern").
Affiliates: Concerns are affiliates of each other when either directly or
indirectly (1) one concern (other than an investment company licensed under the
Small Business Investment Act of 1958 or registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended), controlp -r has the power to control the other,
or (2) a third party or parties (other than an investment company licensed under
the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 or registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended), controls or has the power to control both.
Id. § 121.3-2(a) (1974).
101. Id. § 107.301(d) (1974).
102. Id. § 107.301(c).
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applicable laws,1 3 a lower rate prescribed by state statute would
prevail over the SBA's maximum rate.'04 Cost of money is defined as
the sum of all charges of whatever description, other than management
and certain closing fees,' "5 imposed on the small concern.106 The
purpose of this regulation is the protection of the small concern, which
is not always in a strong bargaining position when it seeks financing.
Equity financings are subject to restrictions related to control over
the small concern. The Small Business Act defines a small concern as
one: "which is independently owned and operated ... , 07 The regu-
lations state that the SBIAct "does not contemplate that Licensees shall
operate business enterprises or function as holding companies exercising
control over such enterprises."' 0 Activities not contemplated by the
SBIAct violate the regulations.' 0 9 The SBA has not prohibited control
altogether, since it may become necessary for the protection of an
investment. A requirement of prior approval, in situations that may be
emergencies, would not be practical. The SBA, therefore, permits the
assumption of temporary control and requires a plan of divestiture, and
a justification of the necessity for taking control. Such plan and
justification must be filed for the SBA's approval within 30 days after
assuming control. The divestiture plan must be enforceable by the small
concern or its stockholders, it must be completed within a reasonable
time which cannot exceed 7 years, and must be certified as fair by the
parties. The SBA's approval, which (without objection from the SBA)
will be deemed given after 90 days from filing, is a condition of the
continuance of the license. Divestiture plans must be adjusted to
changed circumstances.' 10 Control is defined as the power to direct
the management or policies of a business.'' 1  This definition parallels
that under the Small Business Act.' 12 It differs, however, in one
important respect: while ownership of 50% of the votes in a closely
held concern, or 25% in a concern with more than 50 shareholders, is
presumed to be control, the potential ownership of stock through
103. Id. § 107.802.
104. National Banks are limited to the legal rate applicable in their state for state banks, and
to a formula rate where state law is silent. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970). An
excess rate works a forfeiture on the entire interest. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 86
(1970). No such limitation or forfeiture is contained in the Small Business Investment
Act, but since Small Business Investment Companies are organized under state law, they
are generally subject to state law. 13 C.F.R. § 107.802 (1974). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 681(a)
(1970). Where state law does not protect corporate borrowers, the SBA's statutory
mission to aid small business requires an interest ceiling. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1970).
105. 13 C.F.R. §§ 107.601, 107.1004(d) (1974).
106. The cost of money computation includes all charges, whether levied for the benefit of the
licensee, or for the benefit of a third party.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1970). Accord, 15 U.S.C. § 662(5) (1970).
108. 13 C.F.R. § 107.901(a) (1974).
109. Id. § 107.803.
110. Id. § 107.901(d).
111. Id. § 107.3. Cf. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9)
(1970). See generally II L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 770-87 (2d ed. 1961).
112. 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-16(c) (1974).
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conversion or option privileges is not considered.' ' 3 On exercise of the
options, if control results, the justification and divestiture plan becomes
mandatory.
Since a basic purpose of the SBIAct is the provision of funds to small
concerns, the general rule is that small business securities may only be
acquired from their issuer.' 1 ' There are, however, exceptions to this
general rule. One exception is the financing of an ownership change.
Such change may become desirable for many reasons: a dissident co-
owner may hurt a small concern; a concern may wish to dispose of a
division, or may have to do so for antitrust reasons, and the division
may have the potential of becoming a viable independent small con-
cern; an owner may want to retire, or an owner may sell his business to
a disadvantaged person. In such cases, a SBIC may finance the change
by extending financing to the new owners, notwithstanding that such
funds do not inure to the small concern, but are used to buy out the
former owners.' ' '
Another exception is available for the purchase of securities in an
underwriting. Here, a Licensee may act as a "stand by" underwriter,
purchasing a certain amount of eligible securities within the "overline"
limit' ' 6 in a public underwriting, provided that such public offering is
at least 50% "primary," i.e. on behalf of the issuing small concern,
rather than of a selling stockholder, and the purchase is made within 90
days after the public offering is first lawfully made.' ' '
Both the change of ownership financing and the purchase from an
underwriter must fit within the same 20% limitation which also in-
cludes short-term financing and financing with rapid amortization.' 1
MANAGEMENT SERVICES
Providing advisory services is one of the three basic statutory func-
tions of a SBIC,' ' 9 along with equity investments in and loans to small
113. See 13 C.F.R. § 107.901(b) (1974). But see 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-16(c)(4) (1974) (emphasis
added) which states:
Stock options and convertible debentures exercisable at the time of, or within a
relatively short time after a size determination, and agreements to merge in the
future, are considered as having a present effect on the power to control the
concern. Therefore, in making a size determination, such options, debentures, and
agreements are treated as though the rights held thereunder had been exercised
prior to the date of the determination.
Accord, North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 693 (1946): "Domination may spring as
readily from subtle or unexercised power as from arbitrary imposition of command.,,
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1939).
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 684(a) (1974).
115. 13 C.F.R. § 107.812 (1974).
116. Id: § 107.301(d).
117. Id. § 107.504(a), (b)(3).
118. Id. § 107.504(a).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 687(b) (1970).
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concerns.' 20 The regulations permit such services, which must be
technical as distinguished from executive, to relate to financial, manage-
ment, administrative or operating activities of a small concern, but such
services may not lead to the exercise of control.' 2, Where a Licensee
agrees to perform such services, they must be approved each year by
the principals of the small concern, and by the SBA.' 22 Charges for
such services must be competitive, and the Licensee must maintain
records of time spent and charges made.' 23 The Licensee may perform
such services through an Associate, including its own investment/adviser
manager' 24 (subject to the conflicts-of-interest regulation' 2 5 ),
through an independent consultant under contract,'26 or through a
wholly owned subsidiary under the Licensee's close and responsible
supervision.' 2 ' All are subject to the SBA's approval.
RESTRICTIONS ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Sec. 312 of the SBIAct requires the SBA to control conflicts of
interest which may be detrimental to portfolio concerns, to the SBIC or
to the stockholders of either. Such conflicts may arise in transactions of
the SBIC with shareholders, officers, or directors of the SBIC, or in
transactions with small concerns in which such insiders have an interest,
or in reciprocal transactions between concerns in which insiders have an
interest, and other SBICs. In these cases the SBA evaluates the transac-
tion, and if it finds it otherwise acceptable, it makes public disclosure
before approval, to give third parties the opportunity of timely com-
ment.
This statutory requirement is implemented by the regulations, which
define "Associate of a Licensee,'' 28 and require prior SBA approval of
transactions involving such Associates. Self-dealing to the prejudice of
the SBIC and its shareholders, the small concern, or the SBA is flatly
prohibited;'29 as a creditor, the SBA must also protect its own in-
terests. The definition of "Associate" is fairly involved, but can be
summarized as concerning all "insiders" of the SBIC, such as officers,
directors, major stockholders and control persons, their close relatives
120. A SBIC may also render services such as generation of business, initial investigation and
servicing of small business investments for other investors and lenders. Conversely, it
may utilize and pay for such services from other investors with which it is not otherwise
affiliated.
121. 13 C.F.R. § 107.3, 107.901 (1974) (respectively defining and regulating "control").
122. Id.§§107.601(a). Contra, 13 C.F.R. § 107.601(a) (1973) (where such. annual approval was
not required).
123. 13 C.F.R. § 107.601(a) (1974).
124. Id. §§ 107.3, 107.809(a) (respectively defining and regulating the "Investment Adviser/
Manager").
125. Id. § 107.1004(d).
126. Id. § 107.601(b).
127. Id. § 107.601(c).
128. Id. § 107.3.
129. Id. § 107.1004(a).
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and persons controlled by or controlling the "insiders" of the SBIC.
Sec. 107.1004 subjects to public disclosure and SBA approval:
(1) financing extended to an Associate,
(2) financings among two or more SBICs and small concerns (pursu-
ant to an understanding that these financings will be made in
reciprocal or circular fashion),
(3) borrowing from a portfolio concern or its insiders,
(4) financings to enable a small concern to repay an Associate, or
(5) to purchase property from an Associate.' '0
To this last restriction, there is an exception for an Associate who is a
regular supplier of the small concern: in that 50% of the financing
proceeds may be used to purchase goods and services from such
supplier, and a disadvantaged small concern financed by a Sec. 301(d)
Licensee may use 75% of its financing proceeds. The purpose of this
exception is, for example, to permit franchisors to finance and supply
their franchisees with the help of an operating SBIC, or permit whole-
salers to finance their retail distributors. However, the exception is
available only for purchases from a regular supplier, not for occasional
or infrequent transactions.' ',
The conflicts regulation also requires that joint financing by a SBIC
and its Associate may not be less favorable to the SBIC than to the
Associate, and the burden of proving at least parity is on the SBIC.' 3 2
The regulation further restricts payment of compensation by port-
folio concerns to Associates. Finder's fees, kickbacks and the like are
restricted,' 33 but fees for bona fide closing services may be paid.' '
An Associate may also perform management services for a small con-
cern, subject to the SBA's annual approval, but in that case the
Licensee is responsible for the reasonableness of the fee, and the
Licensee must collect the fee and pay the Associate.' 3
It is a common practice of venture capitalists to require a portfolio
concern to elect as a director, or otherwise admit to the inner circle, a
representative of the investor, commonly known as the "watch dog."
The regulation allows for the practice by exempting the "watch dog"
relationship from the restriction otherwise barring such affiliation, but
the "watch dog" may not be a member of the small concern's inner
circle in his own right or have a personal stake in the small concern.
This prevents circumvention of the conflicts rule by nominating as
"watch dog" an insider whose personal interest may disqualify the
small concern from financing without the approval of the SBA.
1 3 6
130. Id. § 107.1004(b).
131. Id. § 107.1001(g). Where financing is tied in with sales, the antitrust laws may apply.
Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel, 394 U.S. 495 (19691.
132. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1004(c) (1974).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 216 (1970) (which declares such payments to be a criminal offense).
134. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1004(d) (1974).
135. Id. §§ 107.601(b), 107.1004(d).
136. Id. § 107.1004(f).
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Another regulation subjects the sale of SBIC assets to SBIC Asso-
ciates, and the sale of portfolio securities to a competitor of the small
concern involved, to certain safeguards. '1 3 7 In requesting the SBA's
approval of an asset sale to an insider, the SBIC must demonstrate that
the sale is at least as favorable as an arm's-length transaction. In selling
to a competitor, if the small concern is not under the SBIC's control, it
must agree to the sale, or the SBA must approve. It is evident that asset
sales to insiders may harm the SBIC and the SBA's creditor position. It
would be inconsistent with the SBA's role as the protector of small
business to permit a SBIC to sell out a portfolio concern to its
competitors but the regulation does not bar such a sale with the
portfolio concern's free consent, or with the SBA's approval.
OTHER RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS
Since a SBIC almost always operates with government funds, the
SBA must make sure that such funds achieve their proper destination.
It could not do so, if a SBIC could finance small concerns which, in
turn, would reinvest these funds in other concerns which may or may
not be eligible for SBIC assistance. Accordingly, the regulations bar
financing for reinvestment as a general proposition. An exception is
provided for young financial concerns owned by disadvantaged persons,
if such concerns are not banks, agricultural credit companies, or thrift
institutions which are not federally insured. Securities dealers, federal
savings and loan associations and certain other financial concerns suited
to capital formation among the disadvantaged may receive venture
capital investments' ' ' from any Licensee, up to the amount of such
Licensee's private capital.' '9
Another regulation prohibits SBIC financing for SBIC capitaliza-
tion.' 4 0 Not only would such financing violate the prohibition against
reinvestment, but it would dilute the private investment which the SBA
leverages. Private enterprise initiative is a basic ingredient of the SBIC
program.' 4 ' For this reason, SBIC funds, leveraged by, or eligible for
leverage from the SBA may not be used, directly or indirectly, to
provide any part of another SBIC's private capital. An exception to this
general rule is provided for the formation of Sec. 301(d) Licensees by
other SBICs: capital contributions to such Licensees are permitted for
that part of their private capital which exceeds the statutory minimum
of $150,000.' 4 2 However, leverage funds may not be used to provide
capital which could be again leveraged by the SBA; such contributions
are, therefore, equated with capital reductions of the contributor. The
137. Id. § 107.1005.
138. Id. § 107.202(b).
139. Id. § 107.1001(a).
140. Id. § 107.1001(b).
141. See p. 187 & note 28 supra.
142. Cf. p. 187 & note 29 supra (the 10% cash supplement is not required).
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SBA also requires that a SBIC participating in the formation of a Sec.
301(d) Licensee have at least a 20% interest, or otherwise demonstrate
that it will be an active investor in the Sec. 301(d) Licensee.
1 4 3
Since housing and other real estate-related activities are the particular
concern of other federal programs, the SBA has restricted its own
assistance to such activities.' 4 4  Logically, SBIC assistance to such
activities is also restricted. In addition to the restrictions outlined
before,' 4 ' real estate operators, owners and lessors of real property, as
well as buyers and sellers of real estate are barred from SBIC assist-
ance,' 46 but subdividers and developers, and certain other real estate-
related activities which constitute an active and continuous business
operation are eligible.' 4 ' The financing of real estate acquisitions by
eligible real estate concerns is subject to the requirement of prompt and
substantial improvement. The regulation allows for the possibility that
a planned real estate development may sometimes fall through. Accord-
ingly, while acquisition of land for speculative purpose, i.e. without
prompt and substantial improvement, is barred, a showing of changed
circumstances will excuse the failure of such improvement.' 4 S
Agriculture is also the concern of other federal programs. Ac-
cordingly, the financing of agricultural activities is prohibited. Recog-
nizing, however, that some agriculture-related business activities ("agri-
business") are not included in these other programs, a showing of
ineligibility will qualify an agribusiness, such as feed lots, for SBIC
assistance, unless the activity involves production which is eligible for
support payments or production loans from the Department of Agricul-
ture. ' 41
Since it is the stated policy of the SBIAct to "improve and stimulate
the national economy, ' ' ' it follows that SBICs may not invest
abroad. Recognizing, however, that a domestic concern may require
financing of imports, or of its foreign operation, the regulations permit
financing for these purposes, if the majority of the domestic concern's
assets and activities remain in the United States.' ,' Thus, the interposi-
tion of a domestic conduit, e.g., a straw corporation, will not make
foreign investment possible.
The function of the SBIC program is "to stimulate and supplement
143. 13 C.F.R. § 107.813 (1974). See also p. 203 infra (discussing the purchase of portfolio
securities of one licensee by another).
144. 13 C.F.R. § 120.2(d)(8) (1974).
145. See p. 188 & note 32 supra.
146. These activities comprise Major Group 65 of the STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION
MANUAL, supra note 32.
147. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1001(c)(1) (1974). "Operative builders" are no longer listed under Major
Group 65, therefore, no exception need be made for such enterprises. The principle that
only active and continuous business operations are eligible for assistance applies
generally. Id. § 107.1001(f); cf. id. § 120.2(d)(2).
148. Id. § 107.1001(c)(2) (defining "prompt and substantial improvement" as improvement
within a year and in an amount of at least half of the financing).
149. Id. § 107.1001(h); cf. id. § 120.2(d)(9).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
151. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1001(e) (1974).
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the flow"' s 2 of funds to meet the needs of small concerns; therefore, a
SBIC may not remain inactive. To this end, the regulations require
qualified management available to the public' -5 at accessible offices
during business hours,' ' ' and require a Licensee to justify its failure to
maintain a stated minimum activity. The regulations erect a rebuttable
presumption that a SBIC is inactive if it has not invested at least 25% of
its idle funds during an 18-month period, if its idle funds, in turn,
exceed 25% of its assets.' ' s
"Idle funds" are those funds of a SBIC "not reasonably needed for
their current operations," i.e. neither invested in or committed to small
concerns nor maintained as a petty cash fund. Such idle funds may only
be invested in direct obligations, or obligations guaranteed by the
United States, in savings accounts up to the amount insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,' 5 6 or in certificates
of bank deposits maturing within one year." ' Investments of idle
funds in any other securities, irrespective of their quality or yield, are
prohibited.
A Licensee may not finance activities contrary to the public interest.
These prohibited activities include monopolistic practices,' 5 8 invest-
ments in "runaway industries" which result in the substantial increase
of unemployment in any area of the country' 5' and gambling.' 60 This
last prohibition, in line with changing attitudes, should be liberalized
soon, since the SBA has already liberalized its own loan policy to
permit loans to small concerns which derive no more than one-third of
their annual gross income from the sale of state lottery tickets under a
state license, or from gaming in states which permit it.' 6 1
To protect its creditor position, the SBA controls the compensation
of officers, directors and employees earning in excess of $10,000 per
year.' 62
While generally a Licensee may retain its investment in a concern
which was small at the time of investment, but subsequently grew large,
it may retain securities obtained in the merger of a portfolio concern
into a large business only until it can recover its original investment plus
152. 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
153. 13 C.F.R. § 107.101(a) (1974).
154. Id. § 107.101(b).
155. Id. § 107.1003.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 687(b) (1970).
157. 13 C.F.R. § 107.808 (1974).
158. The SBA mission to preserve and expand competition in the American economic system
of private enterprise is carried over into the Small Business Investment Act by § 308(0
thereof. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631, 687(f) (1970). But see 15 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1970); 13 C.F.R. §
107.304 (1974) (a licensee providing equity capital to a small concern may require that it
have no other creditors).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
160. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1001(d) (1974).
161. Id. § 120.2(d)(5).




a reasonable return thereon, and thereafter only so long as the holding
does not interfere with new investments. It may make additional
investment in a concern which has outgrown the SBA's size standard
only pursuant to a commitment made while the portfolio concern was
eligible, or to protect its investment in the formerly small concern.' 63
While a SBIC may not usually purchase small business securities from
anyone but the issuer,' 64 the regulations recognize that one SBIC may
have a surplus of idle funds, while another SBIC finds itself short of
cash. In such circumstances, one SBIC may acquire the portfolio
securities of another, but such purchases may not exceed one-third of
the purchaser's total assets. If the seller guarantees debt securities, such
guaranty may not exceed 90% of the amount outstanding at the time of
default.' 6 ' Where the selling Licensee retains a part of its investment in
a portfolio concern, selling the other, or makes new investments in a
portfolio concern for which it has extended a guaranty in connection
with a sale to another Licensee, the liability under the guaranty must be
included in the seller's "overline limit" under Sec. 306(a) of the
Act.' 66
Licensees are required to dispose of assets acquired in liquidation of
portfolio items within a reasonable time in order to maintain their
liquidity. A SBIC may spend funds for the preservation of such assets,
but the sum of such expenditures, added to the original investment,
may exceed the overline limit only with the SBA's approval.' 6 7
Without the SBA's approval, a SBIC may neither transfer its license
to another company,' 68 nor surrender it to the SBA,'6 9 nor volun-
tarily reduce its capital (whether by distribution or by purchase of its
own stock),' 70 nor merge or consolidate with another concern, nor
reorganize its capital structure.
1 71
The SBA is authorized to suspend or revoke, by formal administra-
tive proceeding, the license of a SBIC which has made a false or
misleading written statement to the SBA, 72 or which has wilfully and
repeatedly violated provisions of the Act, the regulations, or a cease-
and-desist order issued under this section. Since most SBICs have
obtained leverage from the SBA, or with its guaranty, a license revoca-
tion would not serve the SBA's entire purpose, which includes repay-
ment of the leverage. Thus, following license revocation, where a SBIC
163. Id. § 107.806.
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 684(a) (Supp. II, 1972), 685(a) (1970). But see 13 C.F.R. § 107.812
(1974).
165. 13 C.F.R. § 107.501 (1974).
166. Id. § 107.807. See also p. 195 supra.
167. Id. § 107.810.
168. Id. § 107.104.
169. Id. § 107.105.
170. Id. § 107.902.
171. Id. § 107.903.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 687a (1970). See also id. § 645 (1970); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1006 (1970).
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does not repay voluntarily, the SBA would have to apply to a federal
court for a money judgment, based on Sec. 308(d), which also provides
for license revocation. In most cases, it is, therefore, more expeditious
for the SBA to apply to a court in the first place. In order to simplify
the court proceeding, which focuses on regulatory violation,' 7 the
SBA has declared that false or misleading statements to the SBA, 1 71 as
well as default under a contract with the SBA, 6 is a violation of the
regulations. This provision enables the SBA to sue on a false or
misleading statement, and to ask for a money judgment, in the same
proceeding. The SBA's enforcement is further facilitated by its statu-
tory right to ask for a receivership, and to be itself appointed receiver in
the court's discretion.' 7
HOUSEKEEPING RULES
The regulations require a plan to safeguard the Licensee's assets,
which includes "dual control", i.e. two signatures for the withdrawal of
assets from custody, or the disbursement of funds, except disburse-
ments up to $1,000.1 78 In addition, it must maintain fidelity insurance
of at least $25,000 for employees with access to its assets.' 79
Books must be currently maintained in accordance with the SBA's
System of Account Classifications.' 8 0 Records are kept for the SBA's
annual inspection,' ' for which the SBA charges a fee based on the
SBIC's assets, with additional charges levied where the examination is
delayed due to some fault of the SBIC. " '2 The regulations prescribe
detailed requirements for record maintenance and preservation.' s 3
In addition to the special reports mentioned above passim whenever
the SBA's approval was mentioned, the SBA requires annual financial
reports, and sometimes special interim reports on an ad hoc basis.' 8 4
The annual (year-end) reports are required to be certified by an in-
dependent certified public accountant according to an Audit Guide
published by the SBA for that purpose.' 8 5 In addition, litigation, other
than simple enforcement actions, must be promptly reported to the
173. 15 U.S.C. §§ 687c, h (1970) (conferring jurisdiction on federal courts, providing for
long-arm jurisdiction, and requiring the federal court to expedite such cases in every
way).
174. Id. § 687c(a).
175. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1008(b) (1974).
176. Id. § 107.1008(a).
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 687c(b)-(c) (1970).
178. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1103 (1974).
179. Id. § 107.1104.
180. See p. 185 & note 15 supra.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 687(b) (1970).
182. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1101 (1970).
183. Id. § 107.1102(a)-(b). See also 17 C.F.R. § 270.31a-2(f) (1973) (preservation of records by
registered companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940).
184. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1102(e)(1) (1974).
185. Id. § 107.1102(e)(2), (g).
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SBA.' 8 6 Reports must be filed in timely fashion, and a civil penalty of
up to $100 for each day of failure may be imposed 87 unless the SBA
excuses such failure on the basis of an application filed before the due
date of the report involved.' 8 8
DUAL REGULATION SBA-SEC
In addition to the SBA regulation, a SBIC may be subject to the
Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") regulation under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act").89 For example,
when a SBIC makes a public offering of its securities or when it has
more than 100 securities holders.'90 A discussion of SEC regulations is
beyond the scope of this article.' ' It should be noted that, by joint
effort of the SEC and the SBA, the burden of dual regulation has been
considerably reduced.' 92 For example, since conflict-of-interest trans-
actions are regulated by the SEC, a 1940 Act company which has
received an exemption for such a transaction, need not apply for an ex-
emption from the SBA.' 9 Also, since the 1940 Act requires the SEC
186. Id. § 107.1102(f).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 687g (1970).
188. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1203 (1974).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1970).
190. An exemption from SEC Regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940 is
provided for SBA-guaranteed debt securities which are publically offered, or held by not
more than one hundred persons.
The term "public offering" as used in section 3(c)(1) of the Act shall not be
deemed to include the offer and sale by a small business investment company,
licensed under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, of any debt security
issued by it which is (a) not convertible into, exchangeable for, or accompanied by
any equity security, and (b) guaranteed as to timely payment of principal and
interest by the Small Business Administration and backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States. The holders of any securities offered and sold as
described in this section shall be counted, in the aggregate, as one person for
purposes of section 3(c)(1) of the Act.
17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-3 (1973).
Notwithstanding subsection-(a) of this section, none of the following persons is
an investment company within the meaning of this subchapter:
(1) Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short term
paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and
which is not making and does not presently propose to make a public
offering of its securities.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (1970).
191. See generally Mendelssohn & Cerino, Applications of the Federal Securities Laws to
Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Companies, 16 How. L. J. 744 (1971).
The title notwithstanding, the article discusses SBIC's without limitation to § 301(d)
Licensees (formerly called MESBICS). It was written before adoption of the SBA's
program for minority enterprise investment companies which were then an integral part
of the investment company program. See note 9 supra.
192. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 687(g)(2)(H),(J) (1970) (requiring the SBA to include in its
annual report to the President and the Congress a statement from the SEC enumerating
the actions taken by the latter agency to simplify and minimize the requirements of dual
regulation).
193. 13 C.F.R. § 107.1004(g) (1974). See also id. § 107.1004(e) (imposing a publication




regulation of stock options but the SBIAct does not, 1940 Act com-
panies must comply with the SBA's stock options rule for 1940 Act
companies,' 94 but other SBICs need not.'9' The SBA and the SEC
have cooperated also with respect to financial reports,' 96 and the SBA
calls the requirements of the 1940 Act to the attention of SBICs, when
appropriate.' 9 "
CONCLUSION
While the foregoing discussion cannot be considered an exhaustive
description of the regulatory system governing SBICs,' 98 it is hoped
that the present article affords a bird's-eye view and may encourage
greater utilization of this relatively new and quite flexible venture
capital medium for small business.
194. Id. § 107.805(b)(1) (adopted in cooperation with the SEC).
195. Id. § 107.805(b)(3).
196. Id. § 107.1102(d).
197. E.g., 38 Fed. Reg. 30844 n.9 (1973).
198. No reference has been made to the various benefits which the Internal Revenue Code
confers. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 172(b)(1)(F), 243(a), 542(c)(8), 582(e), 586, 1242-43;
Treas. Reg. § 1.1242-1(a) (1960). Also omitted are the Policy and Procedures Releases
which the SBA issues from time to time to explain its practices and assist SBICs in their
compliance with the regulations.
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